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WRITING REQUIREMENTS AND THE AUTHENTIC ACT IN
LOUISIANA LAW: CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 2236, 2275 & 2278
Theoretical and Historical Framework
Both the common law and French legal systems demand that
certain formal requisites' be fulfilled before some contracts will be
deemed enforceable. Formal requirements may perform evidentiary
(ad probationem) or cautionary (ad solemnitatem) functions.' Writ-
ing requirements are essentially evidentiary in nature and seek to
prevent fraudulent claims based on verbal testimony.3 In addition,
the authentic or notarial act' performs a more basic, cautionary func-
tion: the law deems certain contracts to be of such importance that
the formality of the authentic act is required to insure that the parties
give serious thought to the obligations represented by the writing.
The writing requirement at common law is contained in the Stat-
ute of Frauds, originally enacted to curb the subornation of perjured
testimony in actions of assumpsit.1 If a contract required by the Stat-
ute to be in writing is not written, it is unenforceable, but not void
for all purposes.' Thus, the Statute of Frauds has been viewed by
some commentators as a rule of evidence rather than a substantive
element of a valid contract.'
1. This comment is confined to an examination of writing requirements and does
not deal with the use of testimonial evidence. For a detailed discussion of Louisiana's
parol evidence rule see Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 779 (1975).
2. S. LITVINOFF AND T. TETE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL LAW OF
JURIDICAL AcTs 128-29 (1969); S. LrrVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE § 341 (1969); [hereinafter cited as LrrvNOFF]. See also 4 AUBRY & ,RAu, DROrr
CIVIL FRANqAIS § 306 (6th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1965) [hereinafter cited as AUBRY
& RAUl; 2 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 275 (1950) [hereinafter cited as 2
CORBIN].
3. 2 CORBIN § 275; 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 1, no. 1106 (11th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as 2 PLANIOL]; S. WILLISTON & G. THOMP-
SON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 448 (rev. ed.
1938) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
4. "Notarial act" and "authentic act" both refer to the same type of instrument.
Unless otherwise specified in a statute, an authentic act is one "which has been exe-
cuted before a notary public or other officer authorized to execute such functions, in
presence of two witnesses, aged at least fourteen years, or of three witnesses if the party
be blind .. "LA. CIV. CODE art. 2234.
5. LrrVINOFF § 341.
6. 2 CORBIN § 275.
7. For instance, an oral contract ordinarily required to be in writing may be valid
in certain circumstances if there has been full or part performance. For a more com-
plete discussion of the uses of an oral contract, see 2 CORBIN § 279; WILLISTON § 446.
8. See 2 CORBIN § 275.
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In France, the writing requirement is included in the French
Civil Code along with the provisions on proof of obligations., Because
failure to reduce a contract to writing where required has no effect
on the obligations themselves, but only on the parties' ability to prove
them, the French writing requirement likewise performs an eviden-
tiary function.'" In contrast, the articles requiring authentic acts are
not placed with the provisions on proof of obligations, but are found
among the substantive provisions governing various contracts. Be-
cause the lack of a required authentic act renders the act void," the
requirement of an authentic act is substantive and its function cau-
tionary.
The writing requirement is much more narrowly construed at
common law and there are many more exceptions to its use than in
France." Part of this difference may be traced to basic distinctions
in the contract law of the two systems. At common law, one of the
functions of consideration is to evidence the consent of the parties,"
so that the functions of consideration and the Statute of Frauds over-
lap; in contrast, under French law, cause does not serve to evidence
consent. Thus, the French necessarily rely upon an independent
writing requirement to evidence consent. In addition, the French re-
quire some contracts not only to be in writing, but to be executed
before a public officer. 5
Much like the French legislation, the Louisiana Civil Code provi-
sions concerning acts under private signature are contained in the
chapter on proof of obligations, 6 while those with respect to authentic
acts are found throughout the legislation as substantive requirements
of particular acts. While it is apparent from this structure that the
Louisiana redactors intended to use a basically French pattern of
organization, Louisiana did not retain the substance of all the French
articles. The result is a hybrid set of provisions which duplicates
neither the substance of the French articles nor the Statute of Frauds.
9. FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 1322-48 (Cachard's transl. 1930).
10. AUBRY & RAU § 306; 2 PLANIOL no. 1106.
11. See, e.g., FRENCH CIw. CODE art. 931 (Cachard's transl. 1930): "Every instru-
ment containing a donation inter vivos shall be executed before notaries in the ordinary
form of contracts, and the original shall remain with them; otherwise such instruments
shall be void."
12. See generally Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 745 (1975).
13. 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 99 (3d ed. W. Jaeger
1957).
14. LITVINOFF §§ 213-14.
15. See note 11, supra, and accompanying text.
16. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2240-50, 2275-83.
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The Writing Requirement of Article 2275
Scope of the Article
Although article 2275 of the Louisiana Civil Code literally re-
quires only that transfers of immovable property be in writing,"
Louisiana courts have construed the article to apply to all contracts
concerning immovable property,'8 except lease." Article 2275 relates
to all immovables in the traditional sense,"0 and supplemental legisla-
tion extends coverage to two other important interests. Timber es-
tates are legislatively classed as immovables" and mineral rights are
categorized as incorporeal immovables; 2 hence, contracts concerning
both interests must be in writing.3 The Louisiana supreme court has
construed the writing requirement liberally when mineral rights are
involved, extending it to all contracts applying to or affecting mineral
rights." This construction produces anomalous results since although
leases of land are not covered by article 2275,5 contracts affecting
mineral leases must be in writing.0
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2275: "Every transfer of immovable property must be in
writing; but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such property, be made, it shall be
good against the vendor, as well as against the vendee, who confesses it when interro-
gated on oath, provided actual delivery has been made of the immovable property thus
sold."
18. Harris v. Crichton, 158 La. 358, 104 So. 114 (1925); Guier v. Guier, 7 La. Ann.
103 (1852) (provision held to apply to grant of a conventional usufruct on land);
Castenado v. Toll, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 557 (La. 1819). Furthermore, any alterations or
extensions of such dispositions must be in writing. Torrey v. Simon-Torrey, Inc., 307
So. 2d 569 (La. 1974). But see Smith v. Hardy, 190 So. 180 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939)
(escrow agreement collateral to a sale of land need not be in writing).
19. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2683; DeJean v. Whisenhunt, 191 La. 608, 186 So. 43 (1938);
Johnson v. Williams, 178 La. 891, 152 So. 556 (1934); Rabassa v. Orleans Navigation
Co., 5 La. 461 (1833); Rachal v. Pearsall, 8 Mart. (O.S.) 702 (La. 1820). But see Brown
v. Martin, 9 La. Ann. 504 (1854) (purchaser of property subject to a lease is not affected
unless lease is evidenced by writing).
20. Guier v. Guier, 7 La. Ann. 103 (1852).
21. LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950).
22. LA. MIN. CODE art. 18. The former LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) (repealed by La. Acts
1974, No. 50, § 3) also classified mineral rights as immovables.
23. Martin Timber Co. v. Jean Lumber Co., 227 La. 894, 80 So. 2d 855 (1955);
Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 219 La. 264, 52 So. 2d 847 (1951); Sabine Lumber Co.
v. Trumbull, 158 La. 621, 104 So. 476 (1925); Harvard v. Lutrell, 68 So. 2d 798 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1953).
24. See, e.g., McRoberts v. Hayes, 248 La. 676, 181 So. 2d 390 (1965); Little v.
Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So. 2d 558 (1964).
25. See text at note 19, supra.
26. See, e.g., McRoberts v. Hayes, 248 La. 676, 181 So. 2d 390 (1965); Little v.
Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So. 2d 558 (1964).
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Because the general sales provisions of the Code apply equally
to the contract of exchange, 7 an exchange has been held to be a
"transfer" within the meaning of article 2275.28 Hence, an exchange
involving the transfer of immovable property must be in writing.
Likewise, since a partition is in essence an exchange of rights in
property, if the partitioned property is immovable, the act is in the
nature of an exchange of immovable property that must also be evi-
denced by a writing.29 One intermediate court has stated that if a
verbal partition is executed and the lines fixed, the partition is
thereby ratified and the co-owners are estopped from questioning the
partition ° The court's position, however, appears inconsistent with
article 2275 and the clear jurisprudential rule as expressed by the
Louisiana supreme court in Fox v. Succession of Broussard."
Numerous contracts, not in themselves transfers or other disposi-
tions of immovable property, have been held to require a writing
under article 2275, since they affect dispositions of immovable prop-
erty. Article 2462 of the Civil Code provides that the contract to sell
or buy immovable property must be in writing32 and acceptances of
offers to sell or buy immovable property have likewise been held to
require a writing.13 It would seem harsh to require a written accept-
ance when there is a separate writing evidencing the contract formed
by the oral offer and acceptance, but if no other writing exists, the
requirement is merely an application of the general rule that con-
tracts to buy or sell immovable property must be in writing.
Contracts granting an option to buy immovable property must
also be in writing3 since they concern the disposition of immovables 5
In addition, a writing is required to exercise an option, as illustrated
by the early case of Barchus v. Johnson."5 In Barchus, plaintiff pur-
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2667.
28. Laycock v. Davidson, 11 La. Ann. 328 (1856) (exchange of slaves); Morgan v.
McGowan, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 209 (La. 1816) (exchange of slaves).
29. Fox v. Succession of Broussard, 161 La. 949, 109 So. 773 (1926); Bach v.
Ballard, 13 La. Ann. 487 (1858); Faulk v. Faulk, 180 So. 887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938)
(dicta). But see Johnson v. Labat, 26 La. Ann. 159 (1874).
30. Faulk v. Faulk, 180 So. 887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
31. 161 La. 949, 109 So. 773 (1926).
32. For the distinction between a contract to sell and the contract of sale, see
Litvinoff, Of the Promise of Sale and the Contract to Sell, 34 LA. L. REV. 1017 (1974).
33. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Lindsay, 227 La. 553, 79 So. 2d 879 (1955);
Dane & Northrop v. Selzer, 63 So. 2d 760 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
34. Hoth v. Schmidt, 220 La. 249, 56 So. 2d 412 (1951); Conklin v. Caffall, 189
La. 301, 179 So. 434 (1938); Barchus v. Johnson, 151 La. 985, 92 So. 566 (1922); Briggs
v. Siggio, 285 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2462.
36. 151 La. 985, 92 So. 566 (1922).
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chased a thirty day option to buy land from defendant. Within the
thirty day period, plaintiff telephoned his acceptance to defendant
and after the expiration of the option period, plaintiff sent a written
acceptance. In denying specific performance, the court held that, to
be effective, the exercise of the option must be tendered to the offeror
in writing prior to the expiration of the specified time period."
If a partnership is formed for the purpose of dealing with inter-
ests in immovable property, the Louisiana supreme court has held
that the partnership agreement must be in writing." In addition, a
mandate to sell or purchase land must be in writing. Although Civil
Code article 2992 states that the contract of mandate may be verbal,
it also specifically requires that the contract conform to the rules
governing testimonial proof of conventional obligations. Thus, Louis-
iana courts apply a kind of "equal dignities" rule to powers of attor-
ney so that the authorization to enter into a contract which must be
in writing must itself be in writing."
Effect of the Article
The effect of a writing is prescribed by Civil Code articles 2242
and 2276. If the act has been acknowledged, it has the same effect as
an authentic act. 0 Even if the act has not been acknowledged, testi-
monial evidence is not admissible "against or beyond what is con-
tained in the acts, nor on what may have been said before, or at the
time of making them, or since." 1 Extrinsic written evidence, how-
ever, is not within the rule.2
There are two situations when a writing is not necessary to trans-
37. Id. at 986, 92 So. at 566. But cf. Briggs v. Siggio, 285 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973), which held that where the offeror notifies the offeree that a verbal accep-
tance is sufficient, the writing requirement is considered fulfilled. The court reasoned
that the writing was a "condition" of the contract that must be considered fulfilled
since defendant prevented its performance. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2040. However, it
would appear that the writing requirement is not a condition to the contract, but is
rather merely an evidentiary requirement. Even if reduction to writing had been made
a condition for the effectiveness of the exercise of the option, article 2040 does not apply
to these facts, since it provides that the fulfillment is imputed when prevented by the
party bound to perform the condition. In Briggs, the offeree was bound to perform and
the offeror prevented performance.
38. Gantt v. Gantt, 6 La. Ann. 677 (1851); Castenado v. Toll, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 557
(La. 1819). See McRoberts v. Hayes, 248 La. 676, 181 So. 2d 390 (1965). Cf. Battle v.
Jenkins, 25 La. Ann. 593 (1873).
39. See, e.g., Opelousas-St. Landry Bank & Trust Co. v. Bruner, 125 So. 507 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1929) (mandate to sell land).
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2242.
41. Id. art. 2276. See Comment, 35 LA. L. REv. 779 (1975).
42. Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 779, 780 (1975).
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fer an immovable. Since the writing requirement is essentially evi-
dentiary, parol evidence admitted without objection will be heard
and considered.4" Further, if a verbal sale has been followed by deliv-
ery, and if a party confesses the sale under oath (e.g., in open court
or upon interrogatories), the writing is not necessary as proof." In the
latter instance, the party seeking to prove the verbal sale by confes-
sion is bound by the answers given under oath.45
Sufficiency of the Writing
There is only one article in the Civil Code detailing the require-
ments of a sufficient writing. Article 2241 declares that the parties
need not have written the act themselves, provided they have signed
it." Article 2241 seems clearly to require that the signature of both
parties appear on the document and the jurisprudence has rarely
deviated from this rule.47 However, in Succession of Jenkins," an
intermediate court, relying on the holding of the supreme court in
Saunders v. Bolden," upheld a writing signed only by the vendor.
Saunders had erroneously announced that the jurisprudence was well
settled that the acceptance of an offer to sell need not be in writing,
upon the strength of a case that did not even involve immovable
property.5" Despite this deviation, the rule that both signatures are
necessary should be considered established law in Louisiana.
The Doctrine of Eking Out Title
Although article 2241 requires only the signatures of the parties,
Louisiana courts have also demanded that a description of the prop-
43. Johnston v. Labat, 26 La. Ann. 159 (1874); Pauline v. Hubert, 14 La. Ann.
161 (1859); Brown v. Frantum, 6 La. 39 (1833); Hopkins v. Lacouture, 4 La. 64 (1832);
Strawbridge v. Warfield, 4 La. 20 (1832); Wells v. Hunter, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 119 (La.
1826); Babineau v. Cormier, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 456 (La. 1823).
44. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2275; Cernich v. Cernich, 210 La. 421, 27 So. 2d 266 (1946);
Guice v. Mason, 156 La. 201, 100 So. 397 (1924); Rubenstein v. Files, 146 La. 727, 84
So. 33 (1920); Perry v. Perry, 122 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
45. See, e.g., Cernich v. Cernich, 210 La. 421, 27 So. 2d 266 (1946); Rubenstein v.
Files, 146 La. 727, 84 So. 33 (1920).
46. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2241: "It is not necessary that those acts [executed under
private signature] be written by the contracting parties, provided they be signed by
them."
47. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Grant Parish Police Jury, 203 La. 1071, 14 So. 2d 855
(1943); Coats v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 174 La. 503, 141 So. 41 (1932); Carona
v. McCallum, 146 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
48. 91 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
49. 155 La. 136, 98 So. 867 (1923).
50. Balch v. Young, 23 La. Ann. 272 (1871).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
erty transferred be included in acts of sale governed by article 2275.11
Unless the description rests substantially on the writing as opposed
to oral supplementary testimony, the entire writing will be held to be
a nullity.52 The most common descriptions that satisfy the test are
those stating name and locality8 or acreage and landmark of the
property transferred54 and those naming the owners of surrounding
lands.5 Under the doctrine, such meager descriptions as "the
Prudhomme Place"5 and "Lovely Point Plantation"57 have been held
sufficient as between the parties to allow oral proof, although
descriptions based on landmarks or by reference to a survey and
township plat are certainly clearer.
If the description rests substantially on the writing, the court will
allow further evidence to determine the exact extent of the transfer.58
This notion of "eking out title" is somewhat akin to the French con-
cept of commencement of proof in writing, derived from article 1348
of the French Civil Code. 51 Under the French doctrine, testimonial
evidence is allowed to prove a contract when there is a writing that
tends to make the existence of the contract probable, although the
writing is not complete proof in itself."0
Under the theory of "eking," the Louisiana courts have consis-
tently admitted testimonial evidence to complete a written descrip-
tion such as "the Judie Lewis place,"'" or descriptions in terms of the
surrounding lands. 2 However, merely because the court admits testi-
monial proof does not mean that the party introducing the oral clari-
51. See, e.g., Lemoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So. 2d 392 (1948).
52. Blevins v. Manufacturer's Record Publishing Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So. 2d 392
(1958); Bryan v. Wisner, 44 La. Ann. 832, 11 So. 290 (1892); Lemoine v. Lacour, 28
So. 2d 784 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946), amended 213 La. 109, 34 So. 2d 392 (1948).
53. Pheland v. Wilson, 114 La. 813, 38 So. 570 (1905); Jackson v. Harris, 136 So.
166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931), reinstated 137 So. 655 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
54. Minor v. Daspit, 128 La. 33, 54 So. 413 (1911); Ramos Lumber & Mfg. Co. v.
Sanders, 117 La. 615, 42 So. 158 (1906).
55. Gary v. Bullock, 206 La. 231, 19 So. 2d 120 (1944); Bayard v. Baldwin Lumber
Co., 157 La. 994, 103 So. 290 (1925).
56. Jackson v. Harris,.136 So. 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931), reinstated 137 So. 655
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
57. Robinson v. Atkins, 105 La. 790, 30 So. 231 (1901).
58. Lemoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So. 2d 392 (1948); Jackson v. Harris, 18
La. App. 434, 136 So. 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
59. See Comment, 35 LA. L. REv. 745, 752 (1975).
60. 2 PLANIOL, no. 1124 at 641. In no. 1125, Planiol further explains that the danger
of testimonial proof is greatly eliminated since the judge relies primarily upon the
written document.
61. Saunders v. Bolden, 155 La. 136, 98 So. 867 (1923).
62. Gary v. Bullock, 206 La. 231, 19 So. 2d 120 (1944).
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fication will prevail. For instance, in Tircuit v. Burton-Swartz Cy-
press Co., 3 a description reciting that "a portion of land was situated
in section 49 of township 12 south, range 15 east, containing 123.01
acres" was deemed sufficient to allow the parties to eke out title by
oral testimony, but the court concluded that the additional evidence
did not complete the description adequately enough to effect a trans-
fer of title.
At some point, the description contained in the writing will be
either insufficient to allow eking or so complete that additional testi-
mony is redundant. While the lower limit includes all those titles
which do not rest substantially on the writings, the cases do not
discuss the upper limit when additional testimony is unnecessary.
Presumably, titles in this category are those reciting descriptions
according to surveys. In the middle ground between the two limits,
the court apparently looks to several factors to determine the availa-
bility of eking out title: description by name or locality, general loca-
tion within township specifications, courses and distances according
to landmarks, names of surrounding owners and quantity specifica-
tions.
Requirements of Article 2278
Promise to Pay the Debt of a Third Person
Article 2278, the other major writing requirement contained in
the Civil Code, concerns four types of acts which cannot be proven
by testimonial evidence.64 The most important of these is the promise
to pay the debt of a third person. This provision extends to surety-
ship, 5 which creates contingent liability, as well as to a direct prom-
63. 162 La. 319, 110 So. 489 (1926).
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2278 as amended by La. Acts 1886, No. 121 provides: "Parol
evidence shall not be received: (1) To prove any acknowledgment or promise to pay
any judgment, sentence or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, either in or
out of this State, for the purpose or in order to take such judgment, sentence or decree
out of prescription, or to revive the same, after prescription has run or been completed.
(2) To prove any acknowledgment or promise of a party deceased to pay any debt or
liability, in order to take such debt or liability out of prescription, or to revive the same
after prescription has run or been completed. (3) To prove any promise to pay the debt
of a third person. (4) To prove any acknowledgment or promise to pay any debt or
liability, evidenced by writing, when prescription has already run. But in all cases
mentioned in this article, the acknowledgment or promise to pay shall be proved by
written evidence signed by the party who is alleged to have made the acknowledgment
or promise or by his agent or attorney in fact, specially authorized in writing so to do."
65. Because by definition suretyship is a promise to pay the debt of a third person,
Louisiana courts have long held that a suretyship agreement must be in writing, citing
article 2278(3). Graves v. Scott, 23 La. Ann. 690 (1871).
1975]
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ise to pay the debt of a third person. A jurisprudential exception to
the rule of article 2278 allows the promise to pay the debt of a third
person to be proven by testimony if the promisor has a business or
precuniary interest underlying his promise."6 This exception has been
drawn from common law authorities, and its effect is to limit the
operation of article 2278(3) to gratuitous promises." It would seem,
however, that the list of article 2278 is rather specific, so that such a
limitation would not fall within the intended scope of the article."
Several cases have failed to recognize that the pecuniary interest
exception, if applicable at all, applies not when the promise is to pay
the promisor's own debt, but only when there is a promise to pay the
debt of a third person. For example, in Fuselier v. Hudson,"5 in which
corporate officers agreed to assume joint liability for corporate debts,
the court found the promisors to be primarily liable and because of
the pecuniary interest exception allowed testimonial evidence in
proof of the debt. Although the result is correct, the court's reasoning
is not. If the promisor has not agreed to pay the debt of another, but
has merely obligated himself jointly with another, he is primarily
liable and article 2278 is inapplicable.70
Other Requirements Under Article 2278
Article 2278(2) excludes testimonial proof to establish a deceased
party's acknowledgment or promise to pay alleged to have inter-
rupted prescription or to have revived a debt after prescription had
run.7 The broad scope of the subsection, including both interruption
and renunciation of prescription," is intended to protect the heirs and
legal representatives of the deceased from "scheming and unscrupu-
lous creditors."73 Article 2278(1) prescribes the same rule for all per-
66. See, e.g., Flick v. Salloum, 163 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Waldrop
Tire & Supply Co. v. Campbell Const. Co., 158 So. 2d 464 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
67. Article 2278 does not extend to a promise by a person to pay the debt of the
promisee, since that promise is not to pay the debt of a third person. Rowe v. Smith,
160 La. 12, 106 So. 657 (1925); Baskin v. Abell, 122 So. 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929).
68. It is submitted that the intent of the article is better served by the decision
in Gateway Barge Line, Inc. v. R.B. Tyler Co., 175 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965),
in which testimonial evidence was not allowed to prove that a contractor had promised
to pay the debt of his subcontractor.
69. 93 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
70. This distinction was recognized in National Material Co. v. Guest, 147 So. 771
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
71. See text of article 2278, note 64, supra.
72. Coyle v. Succession of Creevy, 34 La. Ann. 539 (1882); Goodman v. Rayburn,
27 La. Ann. 639 (1875).
73. Sliman Realty Corp. v. Sliman's Estate, 225 La. 521, 530, 73 So. 2d 447, 450
(1954).
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sons with respect to judgments and court decrees."'
Although its provisions are similar to subsection (2), article 2278
(4) requires a writing for an acknowledgment or promise to pay the
debt of a living person only if the debt has already prescribed."5 Thus,
the courts have held that testimonial evidence is admissible to prove
a promise by a living person which interrupts prescription before it
has run."8
The writing mandated by article 2278 is the same act under
private signature required in article 2275; thus, the rules of suffi-
ciency and effect under articles 2241 and 2242 apply equally to article
2278.77
Miscellaneous Writing Requirements
Scattered throughout the Louisiana Civil Code and Revised
Statutes are a number of writing requirements in addition to those
discussed above. Generally, the same principles of sufficiency and
effect apply, since the private act is governed by article 2241. The
majority of these statutes govern security devices, 8 contracts to avoid
litigation"8 or special interest statutes."
The Authentic Act
Historical Perspective
The authentic act in Louisiana law is derived directly from the
provisions of the French Civil Code.8 ' The French notariate, or insti-
74. See text of article 2278, note 64, supra.
75. Id.
76. The People's Bank v. Girod, 31 La. Ann. 502 (1879); Crone v. The Citizen's
Bank, 28 La. Ann. 449 (1876); Heinz v. Toune, 18 So. 2d 49 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944);
Cook v. Crow, 194 So. 455 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
77. See Sliman Realty Corp. v. Sliman's Estate, 225 La. 521, 73 So. 2d 447 (1954).
See also text at notes 40-45, supra.
78. E.g., mortgages, chattel mortgages and pawns. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3158,
3305; LA. R.S. 9:5352 (1950).
79. E.g., transaction or compromise. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3071.
80. E.g., public contracts and assignments of future wages as against employer.
See LA. R.S. 23:731 (1950); LA. R.S. 33:2213 (1950).
81. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1319 (Cachard's transl. 1930): "An instrument in public
form is absolute proof of the agreement which it contains between the contracting
parties and their heirs or legal representatives. Nevertheless, in case of a criminal case
for forgery, the execution of the instrument alleged to have been forged shall be sus-
pended by the indictment, and in case of a complaint for forgery made incidentally,
the courts may, according to the circumstances, suspend the execution of the instru-
ment temporarily."
1975]
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tution of the notary, was begun in 1302,82 and has since been strictly
regulated by statute. For instance, notaires are required to keep a
register and to report to the court concerning documents which ap-
pear to be tainted by fraud or duress.83 Because the French notary
functions as an officer of the court, 4 he must meet the ordinary quali-
fications of an officier ministeriel (i.e., French nationality, good char-
acter and fulfillment of military obligation)85 and must spend an
apprenticeship of four to six years in a notary's office. 6
In fulfilling his obligations, the notaire serves not only as a public
witness, but is also the impartial legal advisor for the parties. 7 The
trained lawyer is more closely his American counterpart than is the
notary public.8 The notariate is regulated by the local Chambre des
Notaires, a council empowered to censure and even to suspend a
notary from office permanently for breach of his notarial duties. A
person so suspended suffers a loss of his political rights, including the
right to vote.89
Contrasted with the rules of such a disciplined institution are the
provisions governing the notariate in Louisiana. 0 To qualify for off-
ice, the applicant must only post bond and prove his competency to
a panel of notaries.' Even examination before the panel is unneces-
sary if the applicant is an attorney licensed to practice in Louisiana."
Unlike the French, Louisiana has no body specifically appointed to
regulate the notariate.
Notwithstanding the marked differences in the notarial institu-
tions, the effect of an act passed before a notary in Louisiana is the
same as that passed before a notaire in France; that is, it is full proof
of what is contained in the act. 3 Thus, the effectiveness of the cau-
tionary function of the authentic act in Louisiana is based only upon
the presumption that "a public officer, exercising a high and impor-
82. A. ENGELMANN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 24 (1927).
83. Id.
84. P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 102 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
HERZOG].
85. Id.
86. Id. at 103: "Candidates must ordinarily have worked as clerks in a notary's
office for six years before they receive an official appointment. The period of clerkship
is only four years for candidates who have a degree of docteur or licencik in law, or
who have attended one of the accredited training institutes for notaires."
87. R. DAVID & H. DEVRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 24 (1958); HERZOG at 102.
88. R. DAVID & H. DEVRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 24 (1958).
89. HERZOG at 105-07.
90. See Title 35, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.
91. Id. §§ 191, 253, 392-93, 622.
92. Id. § 191 (Supp. 1966). See also LA. R.S. 35:253, 393, 622 (1950).
93. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2236.
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tant trust,. . . has done his duty when acting within the scope of his
authority.""4 Because Louisiana imposes few sanctions on notaries for
breaches of the public trust, it seems questionable to accord to the
Louisiana authentic act the full weight of proof without adequate
provision for the parties' protection.
Effect of the Authentic Act
The authentic act performs both an evidentiary and cautionary
function. When the formality is required for a particular act, it serves
the cautionary purpose, and, if omitted, the act is null and void. 5
Although all the acts required by law to be in authentic form are too
numerous to discuss, several of the more important ones bear men-
tioning. Since an act is required to be in authentic form to impress
upon the parties the seriousness of their actions, there must be an
authentic act for a donation," for certain types of testaments" and
for certain solemn acts of status, such as the legitimation of chil-
dren."8
When the parties execute an authentic act, whether required or
not, its use is governed by article 2236, and its evidentiary function
comes into play.9 Article 2236 provides that the authentic act oper-
ates as full proof of the agreement contained in it against the con-
tracting parties, their heirs and assigns. While Louisiana courts have
nearly always reached the proper result in excluding extrinsic evi-
dence against an authentic act, much of the language used appears
to be inconsistent with the Civil Code. For example, in Gary v.
Bullock, '" the supreme court applied the common law theory of es-
toppel by deed to exclude extrinsic evidence instead of using article
2236 to reach the same result. In addition, some courts have spoken
of article 2236 as a part of the "parol evidence rule."'' While the
application of either the "parol evidence rule" or the "full proof"
provision of article 2236 may lead to identical results in many cases
(i.e., exclusion of extrinsic oral evidence), it may be argued that the
many exceptions to the parol evidence rule should not apply with
equal force to the authentic act whose function is more than merely
94. Succession of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95, 96 (1852).
95. Miller v. Andrus, 1 La. Ann. 237 (1846).
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1536.
97. Id. arts. 1578 (nuncupative testament by public act), 1584 (mystic testament).
98. Id. art. 200.
99. For a discussion of the function and effect of the authentic act, see Succession
of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95 (1852).
100. 206 La. 231, 19 So. 2d 120 (1944).
101. See, e.g., Smith v. Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953).
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evidentiary.' 0 Imposing the parol evidence rule upon the authentic
act seems analytically incongruous with the system of proof of
obligations outlined in the Civil Code.
Attacking the Authentic Act
The authentic act is clothed with a presumption of genuineness
that may be rebutted, although the party attacking the act bears the
burden of proving the invalidity or falsehood.' 3 Among the insuffi-
ciencies of form which have been held to vitiate an authentic act are
the failure of the notary and witnesses to sign the act, 04 the failure
to sign in the presence of the notary and witnesses,0 5 and the failure
to include the date of the act on its face.' The act need not, however,
be passed in the notary's office. 107 If for any reason the act loses its
authentic effect, it may still function as an act under private signa-
ture.108
In addition, the grant by article 2239 of the Louisiana Civil Code
to forced heirs of the right "to annul absolutely and by parol evidence
the simulated contracts of those from whom they inherit," extends
to simulations in authentic form. Although an early Louisiana su-
preme court decision reasoned that the right to annul contracts as
simulations belongs only to forced heirs, 00 later cases have allowed
other interested third parties to use writings and interrogatories to
assail allegedly simulated authentic acts."0 Whatever the extent of
the application of article 2239, however, it is a true exception to the
full proof rule. Other provisions of the Code provide a similar excep-
tion for creditors attacking the obligation itself via the revocatory
action, if the contract is one in fraud of their rights."'
102. However, the Louisiana supreme court has used the same criteria for deter-
mining if an exception to the parol evidence rule exists whether the act is in authentic
or nonauthentic form. See Comment, 35 LA. L. REV. 779, 782 (1975).
103. Barron v. Jackson Parish Bank, 184 La. 886, 168 So. 90 (1936); Perry v. Akin,
174 La. 472, 141 So. 32 (1932); Eschete v. Kraemer, 129 So. 2d 475 (La. App. lst Cir.
1961).
104. West Louisiana Bank v. Dawson, 154 La. 830, 98 So. 262 (1923); Baker v.
Baker, 125 La. 969, 52 So. 115 (1910).
105. Abshire v. Comeaux, 159 La. 1087, 106 So. 574 (1925); Colonial Trust Co. v.
St. John Lumber Co., 138 La. 1033, 71 So. 147 (1916); Wessell v. Kite, 142 So. 363 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1932).
106. Livingston v. Dick, 1 La. Ann. 323 (1846).
107. LA. R.S. 35:10 (Supp. 1974); Desonier v. Hebert, 177 So. 423 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1937).
108. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2235.
109. Louis v. Richard, 12 La. Ann. 684 (1856).
110. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 214 La. 50, 36 So. 2d 635 (1948); Johnson v. Cam-
pagna, 200 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
111. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1970-77.
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If fraud, error, or certain other defenses are alleged, extrinsic
evidence may be offered to attack the authentic act."' Since in such
cases the parties do not attack the writing as such, but rather assert
defenses to the obligations therein, these allegations are not true
"exceptions" to the full proof rule."' For example, in Smith v.
Smith,"' a husband sought to annul a contract in authentic form
between himself and his wife on the grounds that the act was prohib-
ited by law and therefore void. The court allowed the testimony with
little discussion of whether admission was in conflict with the full
proof rule. The implicit reasoning of the case is that the husband was
not attacking the written act as false, but rather was attacking the
capacity of the parties to contract. The same reasoning should apply
to contracts assailed on the basis of fraud, error, unlawful cause, acts
in fraud of creditors, and similar vices which render contracts null.
The only misrepresentation or "fraud" that is an attack on the act
itself is forgery; however, article 2236 clearly allows the admission of
extrinsic evidence to establish a forgery and thereby nullify the act."5
Once the court determines that an authentic act is assailable, it
may be attacked by other writings or by answers to an interroga-
tory."' In addition, forced heirs may attack a simulation by testimo-
nial evidence." 7 Unlike the rights accorded forced heirs and others to
challenge allegedly simulated authentic acts as provided by article
2239, there is no legislative basis for attack on an authentic act by
an interrogatory. Apparently the practice was derived from the use
of such devices in the proof of verbal sales."'
112. Overby v. Beach, 220 La. 77, 55 So. 2d 873 (1951); Paciera v. Benitz, 284 So.
2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
113. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1762: "The contract must not be confounded with the
instrument in writing by which it is witnessed. The contract may subsist, although the
written act may, for some defect, be declared void; and the written act may be good
and authentic, although the contract it witnesses be illegal. The contract itself is only
void for some cause or defect determined by law."
114. 239 La. 688, 119 So. 2d 827 (1960).
115. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2236: "The authentic act is full proof of the agreement
contained in it, against the contracting parties and their heirs or assigns, unless it be
declared and proved a forgery." For a discussion of the meaning of "forgery" as it
pertains to this article, see Succession of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95 (1852).
116. Jones v. Jones, 214 La. 50, 36 So. 2d 635 (1948); Godwin v. Newstadt, 42 La.
Ann. 735, 7 So. 744 (1890); Semere v. Semere, 10 La. Ann. 204 (1855); Wise v. Johnson,
229 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); Louis v. Garrison, 64 So. 2d 254 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1953). If attacked by interrogatory, the parties are bound by the answers given.
Godwin v. Newstadt, supra; Wise v. Johnson, supra.
117. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2239.
118. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2275. See also text at notes 44-45, supra.
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Conclusion
Despite the myriad of cases involving writings and authentic
acts, the Louisiana courts have not developed a consistent pattern in
applying the provisions of the Code in this area. The courts have often
used common law authority to arrive at just solutions, based on the
policy interest behind requiring a writing. In most cases, the same
result would have been obtained by employing reasoning compatible
with the background of articles 2236, 2275, and 2278. In a few instan-
ces, however, the lack of an understanding of the principles and func-
tions of writing requirements has led to results inconsistent with the
theory of the Civil Code.
Because the results reached in most instances would have been
the same, it would be a relatively simple matter for the courts to
approach the entire area using a framework consistent with the sys-
tem of the Code. In the areas where contrary results have been
reached, the sound approach would be for the legislature either to
affirm the jurisprudence or make the statutes more explicit so as to
provide a better standard for judicial application. Finally, in light of
the vast differences in the French and Louisiana notarial institutions,
it may be appropriate to re-examine the role of the authentic act in
Louisiana law and either to accord it less weight or to strengthen the
regulation of the notariate.
M. Thomas Arceneaux
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